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ABSTRACT 
Political Super PAC Spending on Broadcast Television Following Citizens United 
Alice Morrison-Moncure 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates a television industry claim that the Citizens United Supreme 
Court decision of 2010 would lead to an influx of political revenue for broadcast television 
stations, specifically from Super PACs that were granted the right to receive unlimited donations 
from people and corporations alike. The researcher tested two hypotheses: that increased Super 
PAC spending would cause a decrease in spending by campaigns, and that increased Super PAC 
spending would increase TV stations’ political ad revenue from presidential and gubernatorial 
races. These were tested using quantitative analysis, gathering and drawing inferences from raw 
revenue data from broadcast television stations in three DMAs. Analysis of this raw data 
spanning four years and four general election cycles revealed that candidate spending was 
positively related to Super PAC spending between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2016, 
disproving the first hypothesis. Findings pertaining to the second hypothesis were inconclusive.  
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CHAPTER 1: Statement of the Problem 
 
Ever since the Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission (2010) decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the rules and landscape of campaign finance have been 
thrown into turmoil. Citizens United is a non-profit corporation who sought to release a political 
film about a presidential candidate within 30 days of a primary election, an act that in 2008 was a 
violation of the “[Federal Election Campaign] Act’s ban on corporate-funded electioneering 
communications” (Federal Election Commission, 2010). The Supreme Court agreed to hear 
Citizens United’s case after a lower court upheld the FEC’s existing regulations. With its 
decision that political expenditures and electioneering communications by corporations should 
be constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court ushered in a new era for political interest 
groups whose potential monetary influence on elections was made infinite (FEC, 2010).  
Debates about the decision centered on the condition of free speech and democracy in the 
election process (Neuborne & Adams), and while they were most fierce in the period directly 
following the case, they continued into 2016. Campaign finance reform and the dangers of 
corporate political spending became a campaign issue in the 2016 Democratic Primary, during 
which Sen. Bernie Sanders prided himself on “relying on small donors, rather than on ‘the 
billionaire class’” (Davidson, 2016), referring more specifically to the Super PACs into which 
influential billionaires funnel money.  
In terms of television, however, Super PACs could boost ad sales during a period of 
decreasing ad revenue. Leslie Moonves, the CEO of CBS Corporation once said, “Super PACs 
may be bad for America, but they’re good for CBS” (Stetler, 2013). Due to their non-candidate 
status, Super PACs are barred from receiving the lowest unit rate provisions offered to 
campaigns that buy airtime for political advertisements (FCC, 2015). This, paired with the 
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increasing number of Super PACs in operation suggests that these groups could help to provide 
broadcast television stations with much-needed revenue amid uncertainty in other sources of ad 
revenue. But is a windfall necessarily on its way? Will increased Super PAC spending lead to the 
net increase in revenue foreseen by Moonves, or could campaigns take this increased assistance 
as an opportunity to spend less on their own ads? Has the benefit of Super PAC spending to the 
television industry been overstated? 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The goal of this thesis is to determine the ongoing effects of increased political ad 
spending by both liberal and conservative Super PACs in general elections. So far, arguments on 
the effects of Citizens United (2010) have been mainly semantic - based on hypothetical 
scenarios or focused on the potential for the new campaign finance provisions to be abused. 
Concrete revenue data that have emerged in the five years following the decision have not yet 
been fully integrated into the debate, though they could provide real insight into the true 
influence of Super PACs on the electoral process. The key purpose of gathering and analyzing 
raw revenue data is to determine the effect that Super PAC spending in an election has on their 
affiliated campaigns’ spending and to track any net changes in political ad revenue for television 
stations during this period. While the revenue data gathered will be purely quantitative, the 
inferences that can be drawn from the monetary trends they reveal could be instrumental in 
determining whether increased Super PAC spending is indeed causing stations’ ad revenue to 
increase, and could provide insight into how that money is being distributed nationwide.  
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Research Questions 
RQ1: How has increased Super PAC ad spending affected official campaign spending? 
RQ2: How has the increase in Super PAC ad spending affected net political ad revenue 
for broadcast television stations? 
 
Significance to the Field 
This research will help to clarify the actual magnitude by which the Citizens United 
decision has benefitted the television industry, specifically in the area of ad sales. While it can 
make no suggestions about the political or otherwise qualitative impact of the decision on ad 
sales, the results of this research could call into question the perceived quantitative benefit of 
increased Super PAC spending that was foreseen by Les Moonves among others when it was 
first handed down by the Supreme Court (Stetler, 2013). In the mid-2010s, television ad sales 
suffered from a decline in revenue tied to emerging social trends that include “cord-cutting”, or 
canceling cable or satellite television service; a growing affinity for streaming television services 
such as Netflix and Amazon Prime; and a drop in ratings for broadcast television programs as 
viewers take advantage of an ever-increasing variety of viewing options (Flint & Vranica, 2016). 
On a macro level, the industry as a whole is still recovering from the impact of the economic 
recession of 2008, a period of sudden economic downturn that saw a 10% drop in television ad 
spending in the first quarter of 2009 (The Economist, 2009), and a crisis among the Big 3 
automakers – General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford – two of whom declared bankruptcy in 2009 
and all of whom required a government bailout of nearly $80 billion over the following five 
years (Amadeo, 2014).  
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Additionally, while television remains the most effective advertising medium despite 
falling revenues (Lynch, 2015), it faces the burgeoning threat of cheaper and more adaptable 
online advertising. It is for this reason that it is important to clarify and test the predictions of 
industry optimists who foresee a significant increase in Super PAC revenue in the decade 
following the Citizens United decision, as that revenue’s effect on television ad revenue during 
this time of decline could be vital to the medium’s continued profitability. 
 
Terms and Definitions 
Affiliated -- For the purposes of this study, an “affiliated” Super PAC is one whose ads during 
the general election period were in clear support of or opposition to specific candidates rather 
than an issue. For example, because the Super PAC Priorities USA Action aired advertisements 
against Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, that group would be considered 
“affiliated” with Hillary Clinton. Note that “affiliation” does not imply coordination or collusion 
with any candidate. 
 
DMA -- “Designated Market Area” or media market, a name coined by Nielsen to describe a 
geographic area in which a majority of television viewers receive and watch the same channels. 
While a DMA may be named for the largest city within its boundaries, the area often expands 
beyond the borders of its namesake. Further, “every county in the U.S. is assigned to a DMA” 
(Halbrooks, 2016).      
 
Issue Advertising -- “third-party advertising”, or advertisements funded by third-party groups 
including Super PACs. Because third-party groups are not subject to the same federally 
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mandated selling rates that campaign advertisers enjoy (Federal Communications Commission, 
2015), airtime for issue ads can be sold at a premium. 
 
LUR -- “Lowest Unit Rate”, the special airtime rate offered to legally qualified candidates in the 
45-day period before an election; meant to represent the lowest price being charged to any 
advertiser during the time period or program being requested. (FCC, 2015). 
 
Super PAC -- An emerging type of political action committee, Super PACs may receive 
“unlimited sums from individuals, corporations and labor union to spend in support of, or 
opposition to, federal candidates” (Hasen, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
In order to study and test the current trends in political ad sales for television, the industry 
must be explored in terms of historical context and its operation understood in terms of existing 
federal regulations and common practices. The following overview of the last six years in the 
world of campaign finance and its effect on the televised political ad market will help to clarify 
and define the concepts that will inform key research questions. In turn, those questions will 
guide the data collection process and subsequent analysis.   
 
Review 
Citizens United and the rise of Super PACs 
  In January 1976, the Supreme Court case Buckley v. Valeo (1976) determined that 
“spending money is a form of speech” when striking down several measures to regulate spending 
in campaigns for public office, and ordered the newly-formed Federal Election Commission to 
enforce the decision (Elices, 2010). In January of 2010, the Supreme Court expanded on this 
definition in its ruling on Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission (2010), when the 
majority decided that “the government may not ban political spending by corporations” (Liptak, 
2010, p. 1), effectively striking down a prior statute - The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act - 
which had been in effect since 2002 (Terry & Bard, 2011). This decision represented “the most 
significant changes [to campaign finance law]” since the initial passage of the 1972 Federal 
Election Campaign Act (Corrado, 2014, p.46). While the decision was meant to uphold the belief 
that the government should not regulate political speech, some saw an influx of corporate money 
into politics as a vehicle for corruption (Liptak, 2010).  
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On a legal level, some key arguments for and against the Citizens United decision center 
around the First Amendment and the precedent that had been set by Supreme Court decisions 
before 2010. One notable debate between Floyd Abrams and Burt Neuborne detailed a few of 
these arguments in a January 2011 edition of The Nation (Neuborne, B. & Abrams, F., 2013). 
Neuborne’s (2013) critique of the decision began with the definition of a corporation as an 
“artificial state-created entity with unlimited life...and only one purpose -- making money” (p. 
329). Neuborne (2013) points to one case in which Justice Anthony Kennedy denied 
corporations the protection of the Fifth Amendment because it was “an explicit right of a natural 
person, protecting the realm of human thought and expression” to compare this precedent with 
the 2010 assertion that corporations deserve the same First Amendment rights as people (p. 329). 
He traces the current state of campaign finance law to four incorrect ideas that have nonetheless 
been supported by judges, including the idea that “unlimited spending during an election 
campaign is pure speech, not speech mixed with conduct” and the claim that “while preventing 
corruption justifies regulating campaign contributions, it does not regulate limiting independent 
expenditures” (Neuborne & Abrams, 2013, p. 331). 
Abrams’ (2013) defense of the decision maintained that Citizens United was a realization 
of the full scope of the First Amendment, and that a ruling based on public dissent would have 
been limiting a constitutional right. He counters that Citizens United would require corporate 
campaign contributors to identify themselves, in the interest of transparency and accountability. 
While Citizens United would not require the disclosure of Super PAC -- or “Super Political 
Action Committee” -- contributors, Abrams (2013) notes that such disclosure has never been 
required by Congress, and is an issue entirely unrelated to this particular case. In terms of legal 
precedent, Abrams (2013) refers to a 1947 law meant to ban corporate and union campaign 
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donations that was passed by a conservative Congress but vetoed by President Harry Truman 
because it would be a “dangerous intrusion on free speech” (p. 327). 
 
Political action committees are tax-exempt organizations covered under section 527 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, whose key purpose is to influence the result of an election (Corrado, 
2014). An emerging type of political action committee, Super PACs may receive “unlimited 
sums from individuals, corporations and labor unions to spend in support of, or opposition to, 
federal candidates” (Hasen, 2012, p. 1), setting them apart from the PACs of old, which operated 
under a contribution limit of $5,000 per person. The only restriction on their political power is 
that these groups may not coordinate with their affiliated candidates in any way (Hasen, 2012). 
The Federal Election Commission’s definition of coordination includes literal coordination, 
conduct, and content (Corrado, 2014). Only political parties and party committees -- such as the 
Democratic Congressional Candidate Committee or the National Republican Congressional 
Committee -- are not banned from coordination, due to their “unique relationship” with 
candidates (Corrado, 2014, p. 48). While Super PACs and their activities have been determined 
legal by the Supreme Court, some still argue that they impede the fair political process of 
elections. Not only do Super PACs benefit from weak disclosure laws that allow their 
contributors to remain anonymous, they tend to run more negative advertising than campaigns 
(Hasen, 2012). A study published in the Columbia Journalism Review in 2012 revealed that 
many television stations “do not consistently evaluate the accuracy of political ads they air” 
(Peters, 2016), despite being allowed to refuse inaccurate ads submitted by third-party 
organizations.  
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Despite the partisan uproar ignited by the Citizens United decision amid calls for it to be 
reversed, Super PACs took their new freedoms in stride, growing in size and number at a quick 
pace. A notable Super PAC that was bolstered by the Citizens United decision was American 
Crossroads, founded by former Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie and Karl 
Rove in 2010 (Wing, 2010). Created in part to provide wealthy conservatives an alternative 
organization to support, in the wake of negative press surrounding the RNC, American 
Crossroads raised nearly $30 million in its first year, more than any other Super PAC in 
existence at the time (Wing, 2010). The 2012 presidential election season was the first in which 
the term “Super PAC” was used widely in mainstream media (Hasen, 2012). By the time Barack 
Obama was reelected on November 6, 253 Super PACs had taken part in fundraising and 
spending for their affiliated candidates; in 2016 that number had risen to 345 (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2016). Together, these 345 Super PACs raised $1.5 billion in support of 
political candidates and ballot issues, with nearly 40% of their funding originating from only 50 
donors (Narayanswamy et. al, 2016).  
 
The Role of Television Stations 
Television as a medium has long played an important role in the election process, dating 
back to 1952 when the campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower first employed the use of short 
commercials to create a “warm and caring image” of the Republican candidate (Kaid, 2000).  
Even today, television remains the most effective medium for political advertisements (Moshary, 
2015), reaching 87% of adult Americans (Willis, 2015). In the interest of impartiality and 
fairness, the sale and presentation of political advertisements are closely regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission to ensure that television stations conduct business with all 
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campaigns and issue advertisers in the same way. Two practices that are mandated to ensure 
impartiality in political ad sales are Reasonable Access and Equal Opportunities (Federal 
Communications Commission, 2015). The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, Part 73 
requires that television stations allow political candidates to purchase airtime during any and all 
broadcast dayparts that are also offered to commercial clients (FCC, 2015), although 
broadcasters are not required to sell airtime during news programming. Further, the Act requires 
stations to offer equal airtime to all candidates for office and protects any material aired by a 
candidate from censorship (FCC, 2015).   
 
As a rule, every television station must keep a record of the rates being charged for 
political advertising, as well as all contracts for campaign or issue advertisements. These 
documents are retained in hard copy files for at least two years and must be immediately 
available to any visitor to the station (Terry & Bard, 2011). As of 2014, all commercial television 
stations are required to upload the contents of their public political file into a publicly-available 
folder on the FCC’s website. This vastly simplifies a search process that in the past could be 
“notoriously difficult to navigate without industry knowledge and previous experience” (Terry & 
Bard, p.315, 2011).  
 
Regulatory Issues 
While the sale of television airtime for political advertising is a highly regulated process 
meant to be straightforward and navigable by political campaigns, there are still minor issues that 
prevent ads from being sold by the universal standards desired by the federal government. 
Section 73 of the FCC Rules mandates that political candidates are entitled to pay the LUR, or 
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Lowest Unit Rate, for any advertisement spots purchased within 45 days of a primary election or 
60 days of a general election in which they are running (Federal Communications Commission, 
2015). However, because the LUR for a program is based upon the lowest rates charged on a 
weekly basis, the LUR for a spot in a certain program is not guaranteed to be uniform across all 
the weeks in a requested flight. Additionally, the FCC rules allow for “rate increases during 
election periods... to the extent that such increases constitute “ordinary business practices”, a 
stipulation that can give television stations room to inflate prices for all customers during an 
election season in order to artificially raise the LURs (FCC, 2015). While, by this method, many 
regular clients may refuse to pay increased rates during the election season, stations can still feel 
confident that political advertisements will fill those gaps. 
In a 2012 New York Times overview of Barack Obama’s campaign ad strategy, the 
authors made note of the unexpected inconsistencies among LURs that resulted from the 
ambiguity of the FCC rules (Peters, Confessore, & Cohen, 2012). In their example, Peters et al. 
(2012) reveal that despite being able to reach more viewers in a more highly populated DMA, a 
political ad in southern Virginia “can cost nearly three and a half times as much as ads in the 
same slot in New York City”, a minor phenomenon related to the amount of demand for political 
ads in the two locations. While discrepancies among LURs for candidates can here be attributed 
to market forces (Moshary, 2014), Super PACs are subject to rates that are more vulnerable to 
manipulation, which can be a point of contention during the political season. A study undertaken 
by Sarah Moshary (2014) determined that not only do television stations charge Super PACs the 
highest unit rates for ad spots, these high prices affect the theoretical yield of donations made to 
the organizations. Essentially, a $1,000 donation to a candidate can buy more ad time than a 
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$1,000 donation to a Super PAC. Of course, because there is a limit on individual donations to 
official campaigns, this theory does not necessarily apply at higher donation levels. 
 To monitor and critique the campaign finance system as third-party observers, watchdog 
groups have been quick to bring possible infractions to light, scrutinizing especially the 
relationship between Super PACs and television stations. In December 2015, three watchdog 
groups - the Campaign Legal Center, Common Cause, and the Sunlight Foundation - filed 
complaints with the FCC against 18 television stations who chose to air issue advertisements 
submitted by Independence USA PAC, even though their “true sponsor” Michael Bloomberg 
was not properly identified in the 30-second spots (CLC Staff, 2015). In the same week, Citizens 
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a complaint with the FEC alleging 
that two companies that donated $200,000 to the Jeb Bush-affiliated Super PAC Right to Rise 
were concealing the identities of their true donors (Bykowicz, 2016). Further, the watchdog 
group expressed frustration that the federal government had not taken action against prior 
instances of this infraction, stating that “the lack of enforcement doesn’t mean [CREW] should 
stop sounding alarms” (Bykowicz, 2016). In its defense, Right to Rise maintained that the 
Citizens United decision allowed for corporations to donate to Super PACs.     
 
The 2016 election 
In March 2016, the already record-breaking estimate for political ad spending during the 
2016 election rose another 3%, to an unprecedented $11.7 billion (O’Connell, 2016). From a 
broadcast station standpoint, this was good news. For example, in early 2016, the syndicated 
game show Wheel of Fortune was tracked to surpass its 2012 advertising revenue, defending its 
spot as the most sought-after program by political advertisers, thanks to an older target 
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demographic, “70% [of whom] say they always vote” (Higgins, 2016). Despite optimistic 
estimates, however, a total of $6.8 billion was spent on advertising on federal races in 2016. 
Spending on the presidential race alone totaled $2.65 billion; a decrease from 2012 (Berr, 2016). 
The unexpectedly low spending in the Presidential race can be attributed to the increased amount 
of “earned” media enjoyed by Republican candidate Donald Trump (O’Connell, 2016). Because 
Donald Trump was the beneficiary of many hours of free press on cable and broadcast news 
throughout the election, the Trump campaign was less inclined to spend heavily on airtime for 
advertisements. Additionally, the controversial nature of the press Trump received resulted in 
Super PACs run by Karl Rove and the Koch Brothers withholding financial support for Trump’s 
election (Hackman, 2016). Despite a decrease in spending at the Presidential level, myriad other 
competitive federal races led to increased spending by campaigns and Super PACs at the House 
and Senate level. The 2014 record for Senate race spending - $114 million - was broken by three 
different contests in 2016. By Election Day, the Pennsylvania Senate race had become the most 
expensive in history, with over $162 million spent by Katie McGinty, Sen. Pat Toomey, and 
their affiliated Super PACs. (Hackman, 2016).  
 
Summary 
While the six years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United vs. 
Federal Elections Commission (2010) have not seen the collapse of the electoral process due to 
the corrupting influence of money, they have nonetheless ushered in a new era of campaign 
finance, in which campaigns are bolstered by the support of Super Political Action Committees 
that can receive unlimited donations. Though the increase in Super PACs and the increase in 
political ad spending during elections has been acknowledged with each passing year, little has 
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been discovered about the effect of Super PACs’ spending on their affiliated candidates’ 
spending, despite the fact that “thanks to Federal Communication Commission rules that require 
radio and television stations to maintain public records of political advertisement purchases, [it] 
is a question for which data is available to formulate an answer” (Terry & Bard, 2011). The 
following section expands on this gap in the available research, proposing research questions that 
may demystify this area of campaign finance law and practices. 
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research was conducted to gauge the supposed benefits of increased Super PAC 
spending on broadcast television stations during general elections. Although political campaigns 
receive a federally-mandated discount during a 60-day window or protection period prior to 
general elections, the monetary costs are still significant when purchasing time across many 
DMAs - or Designated Market Areas. Further, because television stations are not required to 
offer issue advertisers any discount on airtime, they often charge the highest rates for requested 
airtime. The first key area of interest is the relationship between Super PAC spending and 
candidate spending. The second area of interest is the supposed monetary benefit of increased 
political ad revenue to broadcast television stations. An increase in any area of advertising is 
welcome during a period when ad revenue has generally been on the decline. As “television” 
expands beyond the physical television set, viewers have the option to watch programs on 
various devices at their leisure, causing traditional live television viewership to drop and causing 
television advertising to appear less valuable than in the past. While the loss of ad revenue has 
been temporarily offset by charging higher rates to advertisers for airtime, such a strategy may 
not be sustainable in the long term (Dawson, 2016). 
The following research questions are addressed in this study: 
 
RQ1: How has increased Super PAC ad spending affected official campaign spending? 
RQ2: How has the increase in Super PAC ad spending affected net political ad revenue 
for broadcast television stations? 
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Based on the information gathered in the literature review, the researcher formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Increased Super PAC spending will cause a decrease in spending by campaigns  
between 2012 and 2016 
H2: Increased Super PAC spending will increase TV stations’ political ad revenue from  
presidential and gubernatorial races between 2012 and 2016 
 
Procedure and Methods 
  The research in this study consisted of a secondary analysis of raw data and qualitative 
data drawn from participant observation. To perform a secondary analysis, the researcher 
gathered and analyzed raw political sales data concerning both Super PAC and official campaign 
spending in the 60-day protection period before presidential and gubernatorial general elections, 
taking note of any trends in the data of the three years studied, as they relate to the research 
questions. Data on political ad spending was drawn from the FCC’s database of television 
stations’ political ad invoices and contracts, which have been publically available on the FCC 
website since 2014 (Terry & Bard, 2011). Data was initially gathered from invoices where 
available, as invoices most accurately reflect the actual amount of political ad spots ordered and 
fulfilled. When invoices were unavailable, data was gathered from the most recent contract.  
The researcher compiled spending data from affiliates and owned stations of the top four 
television networks (CBS, NBC, FOX, and ABC) in the largest DMAs in Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and Ohio; these data were available to view online in the political database of each station, found 
in the Public Inspection Files section of the FCC website (Federal Communications Commission, 
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2017). Based on data released for the 2016 election season, the largest DMAs intersecting with 
these states are Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Cleveland-Akron (Television Bureau of 
Advertising, 2016). These three states and corresponding DMAs were chosen because all three 
were notable “swing states” in the 2012 presidential election, suggesting that campaigns may 
have advertised there more heavily in the weeks leading up to November 6. Gubernatorial 
elections took place in 2013 in Virginia and 2014 in Pennsylvania and Ohio; Presidential 
elections took place in 2012 and 2016. Ultimately, the researcher analyzed data from five 
elections in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, searching for significant trends in candidate and 
campaign spending over that four-year period through a secondary analysis of order totals the 
groups in question.  
Below are details of the five elections that were studied. The list of candidates and 
affiliated Super PACs that participated in each election is based on those whose advertising buys 
were made publicly available on the FCC website. 
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Table 3.1 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections, 2012-2016 
 Elected Office State Candidates Super PACs* 
2012 President N/A Barack Obama (D) 
Mitt Romney (R) 
Priorities USA Action, 
Republican Jewish 
Coalition, Restore Our 
Future, American 
Crossroads, Crossroads 
GPS 
2013 Governor Virginia Terry McAuliffe (D) 
Ken Cuccinelli (R) 
Independence USA, 
Americans For 
Prosperity, Citizens 
United, Ending 
Spending Action Fund, 
National Resources 
Defense Fund 
2014 Governor Ohio Ed FitzGerald (D) 
John Kasich (R) 
N/A 
2014 Governor Pennsylvania Tom Wolf (D) 
Tom Corbett (R) 
Philadelphia Federation 
of Teachers 
2016 President N/A Hillary Clinton (D); 
Donald Trump (R) 
Priorities USA Action, 
Rebuilding America 
Now, Make America #1, 
45 Committee, Great 
America PAC, National 
Horizon, Rebuilding 
America Now, Women 
Vote!  
*This list includes only Super PACs represented during the general election protection period of 
each race in the chosen DMAs; Super PACs that participated exclusively prior to this window 
were not included.  
 
Below is a list of the television stations in each market from which data was collected 
(TVNewsCheck). 
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Table 3.2 Stations within the chosen Designated Market Areas 
 DMA 
Rank 
ABC CBS FOX NBC 
Cleveland-Akron, OH 18 WEWS WOIO WJW WKYC 
Philadelphia,  PA 4 WPVI KYW WTXF WCAU 
Washington, DC 7 WJLA WUSA WTTG WRC 
 
Each set of data was organized and analyzed based on the following questions: 
 
What was the total amount spent by the candidate or Super PAC for X period on Y  
station? 
 
What was the total amount spent by the candidate or Super PAC for the entire ad 
campaign (from the beginning of the general election window until Election Day) on X 
station? 
 
What was the total amount spent by all candidates or all Super PACs for the entire ad 
campaign on the top four stations in the DMA? 
 
How does the full total of all candidates or Super PACs for X year compare to the year 
prior on Y station? What trends are visible across the three years? 
 
Did Super PAC spending increase? Did campaign spending decrease? Was the total 
amount of political spending for each year higher or lower than the year before? 
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CHAPTER 4: Results 
 
The following tables present a summary of the full quantitative data collected from the 
top four television stations in the three DMAs being studied. The first nine tables include data on 
Presidential and Gubernatorial elections between 2012 and 2016, and provide the total amounts 
spent in the general election protection period - or the 60-day window before the general election 
- for each candidate or Super PAC on each television station. In the tables below, the note “no 
data” is provided for candidates or Super PACs whose spending data was not uploaded to the 
FCC database by their respective stations. This note is used only for elections that took place 
before July 1 2014, when it became mandatory to upload spending data for political candidates 
and Super PAC ad campaigns involving elections (FCC, 2017). A more detailed breakdown of 
this data, accounting for every week of each general election cycle, is available in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2012 
Station: WEWS WOIO WJW WKYC 
Barack Obama (D) No data No data No data No data 
Mitt Romney (R) No data No data No data No data 
TOTAL Candidate: N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TOTAL Super PAC: N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 4.2 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2012 
Station: WPVI KYW WTXF WCAU 
Barack Obama (D) No data $381,780 No data No data 
Mitt Romney (R) No data $189,880 No data No data 
Restore Our Future No data $160,250 No data No data 
Republican Jewish 
Coalition 
No data $13,000 No data No data 
TOTAL Candidate: N/A $571,660 N/A N/A 
TOTAL Super PAC: N/A $173,250 N/A N/A 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012 
Station: WJLA WUSA WTTG WRC 
Barack Obama (D) $1,573,325 No data No data No data 
Mitt Romney (R) $2,071,370 No data No data No data 
American Crossroads $1,141,950 No data No data No data 
Priorities USA Action $764,000 No data No data No data 
Crossroads GPS $1,172,350 No data No data No data 
TOTAL Candidate: $3,644,695 N/A N/A N/A 
TOTAL Super PAC: $3,078,300 N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 4.4 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013 
Station: WJLA WUSA WTTG WRC 
Terry McAuliffe (D) $1,146,900 No data No data $1,399,160 
Ken Cuccinelli (R) $720,450 No data No data $787,445 
Independence USA $657,750 No data No data $519,350 
Americans For 
Prosperity 
$12,000 No data No data $75,000 
Citizens United $52,050 No data No data $52,900 
Ending Spending 
Action Fund 
$40,900 No data No data $65,800 
National Resources 
Defense Fund 
$40,200 No data No data $60,900 
TOTAL Candidate: $1,867,350 N/A N/A $2,186,605 
TOTAL Super PAC: $802,900 N/A N/A $773,950 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Cleveland-Akron, Gubernatorial Election 2014 
Station: WEWS WOIO WJW WKYC 
Ed FitzGerald (D) $0 $0 $0 $0 
John Kasich (R) $275,450 $191,145 $277,455 $378,825 
TOTAL Candidate: $275,450 $191,145 $277,455 $378,825 
TOTAL Super PAC: $0 $0 $0 $0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 4.6 Philadelphia, Gubernatorial Election 2014 
Station:  WPVI KYW WTXF WCAU 
Tom Wolf (D) $1,347,600 $526,610 $356,700 $734,100 
Tom Corbett (R) $667,005 $422,935 $263,600 $436,535 
Phila. Federation of 
Teachers 
$0 $53,150 $0 $0 
TOTAL Candidate: $2,014,605 $949,545 $620,300 $1,170,635 
TOTAL Super PAC: $0 $53,150 $0 $0 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2016 
Station:  WEWS WOIO WJW WKYC 
Hillary Clinton (D) $500,025 $1,138,695 $1,195,450 $634,275 
Donald Trump (R) $325,795 $497,290 $843,050 $681,300 
Priorities USA Action $672,600 $644,350 $369,150 $493,150 
Make America #1 $21,000 $10,000 $15,000 $0 
TOTAL Candidate: $825,820 $1,635,985 $2,038,500 $1,315,575 
TOTAL Super PAC: $693,600 $654,350 $384,150 $493,150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 4.8 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016 
Station:  WPVI KYW WTXF WCAU 
Hillary Clinton (D) $1,840,195 $1,325,545 $1,530,100 $1,564,425 
Donald Trump (R) $924,615 $972,000 $763,800 $767,105 
Priorities USA Action $1,748,300 $1,300,275 $572,350 $209,400 
45 Committee $217,600 $1,081,100 $112,950 $10,100 
Great America PAC $496,000 $884,650 $312,200 $141,200 
Make America #1 $17,000 $19,950 $10,000 $0 
National Horizon $404,200 $163,200 $69,900 $143,900 
Rebuilding America 
Now 
$309,100 $225,400 $131,000 $0 
Women Vote! $440,000 $360,000 $305,450 $271,000 
TOTAL Candidate: $2,764,810 $2,297,545 $2,293,900 $2,331,530 
TOTAL Super PAC: $3,632,200 $4,034,575 $1,513,850 $775,600 
  
 
 
Table 4.9 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2016 
Station:  WJLA WUSA WTTG WRC 
Hillary Clinton (D) $119,700 $78,250 $198,175 $168,200 
Donald Trump (R) $226,650 $310,500 $211,775 $360,200 
TOTAL Candidate: $346,350 $388,750 $409,950 $528,400 
TOTAL Super PAC: $0 $0 $0 $0 
   
 
  
Of all the television stations included, only two provided useable data for all three 
election cycles studied: KYW in Philadelphia and WJLA in Washington, DC. These two stations 
were used to draw this study’s conclusions. These stations were “useable” in this study because 
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they were able to provide complete spending data for each of the relevant elections between 
2012 and 2016. While other stations were able to provide full data between 2014 and 2016, their 
2012 data was not uploaded consistently or in its entirety. Without full data from 2012, it would 
not be possible to make accurate inferences or calculate trends in spending on those stations 
across the four-year period of study.  
 
 
Table 4.10 Philadelphia - KYW 2012-2016 
 2012 2014 2016 
TOTAL 
Candidate: 
$571,660 $949,545 $2,297,545 
TOTAL 
Super 
PAC: 
$173,250 $53,150 $4,034,575 
TOTAL 
spending: 
$744,910 $1,002,695 $6,332,120 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Washington, D.C. – WJLA 2012-2016 
 2012 2013 2016 
TOTAL 
Candidate: 
$3,644,695 $1,867,350 $346,350 
TOTAL 
Super 
PAC: 
$3,078,300 $802,900 $0 
TOTAL 
spending: 
$6,722,995 $2,670,250 $346,350 
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Analysis of Data 
Political ad spending by candidates on KYW increased 66.1% between 2012 and 2014, 
and increased 142.0% between 2014 and 2016. Spending by Super PACs decreased by 69.3% 
between 2012 and 2014, but then increased 7490.9% between 2014 and 2016. Across the four-
year period, candidate spending increased by 301.9% while Super PAC spending increased 
2228.8%. 
On WJLA, political ad spending by candidates decreased 48.8% between 2012 and 2013, 
and decreased 81.5% between 2013 and 2016. Spending by Super PACs decreased 73.9% 
between 2012 and 2013, and further decreased 100% between and 2013 and 2016, as no Super 
PAC money was spent on the Washington, DC DMA in that protection period.  
Assessing these data in terms of the research questions and hypotheses, they provide us 
with differing perspectives on the profitability of political ad sales. 
 
RQ1: How has increased Super PAC ad spending affected official campaign spending? 
H1: Increased Super PAC spending will cause a decrease in spending by campaigns  
between 2012 and 2016 
 
KYW in Philadelphia saw an increase in both candidate and Super PAC spending 
between 2012 and 2016, while WJLA in Washington, DC saw a decrease in both candidate and 
Super PAC spending between the same years. In both cases, the relationship between candidate 
and Super PAC spending was direct, and in the one instance that it was not - between 2012 and 
2014 in Philadelphia - an increase in candidate spending was met with a decrease in Super PAC 
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spending, rather than the inverse. Therefore, the hypothesis that an increase in Super PAC 
spending would lead to a decrease in spending by campaigns was incorrect. 
 
 RQ2: How has the increase in Super PAC ad spending affected net political ad revenue  
for broadcast television stations? 
H2: Increased Super PAC spending will increase TV stations’ political ad revenue from  
presidential and gubernatorial races between 2012 and 2016 
 
Between 2012 and 2016, Super PAC revenue on KYW increased by 2228.8%. In that 
same period, net political revenue increased by 750.1%. On WJLA, Super PAC revenue 
decreased by 100% in the four year period, while net political revenue decreased by 94.8%.   
While WJLA saw both decreasing Super PAC and overall political spending, KYW saw both an 
increase in both Super PAC and candidate spending. Therefore, the hypothesis that increasing 
Super PAC spending would increase overall political ad revenue was correct – though the 
assumption that Super PAC spending would increase was incorrect.  
 
Data Limitations 
The quality of the data gathered may have been influenced by three factors: consistency 
of the stations’ adoption of the FCC’s online file upload system, the metrics used to formulate 
the research questions, and the breadth of stations studied. 
Because broadcast television stations were only legally required to upload political 
invoices and contracts for candidate and issue advertisements beginning in 2014 (Terry & Bard, 
2011), and because stations are only required to retain physical copies of these documents for 
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two years, 2012 is the earliest year for which any information was available on the FCC website. 
As such, data was inconsistently available for the 2012 presidential election and 2013 
gubernatorial election. Beyond its effect on data collection for this research, that may be a reason 
that this area of research has not yet been explored more fully - as data gathered between 2014 
and 2018 is more likely to be complete across all stations compared to data between 2012 and 
2016. 
The perspective of the research was skewed by a flawed metric used to formulate both 
research questions. The two research questions were based on the documented nationwide 
increase in Super PACs’ political ad spending since the 2010 Citizens United decision (Stetler, 
2013). However, the data collected from the two viable sources - KYW and WJLA - revealed 
that the nationwide increase in political ad spending is not reflected in every DMA. 
Coincidentally, a 2013 Mother Jones article that discussed the impact of Super PACs on 
television had highlighted WJLA specifically as a station that seemed poised to profit in the 
future due to its location in a battleground state and impressive political revenue in 2012 (Kroll, 
2013). However, while KYW saw increases in both candidate and Super PAC spending between 
2012 and 2016, WJLA lost 90% of its presidential candidate spending and 100% of presidential 
Super PAC spending between those same years. It remains to be seen if WJLA will lose the same 
percentage of gubernatorial candidate and Super PAC spending in the November 2017 election - 
because at the time of writing, the gubernatorial election is still in progress – though based on the 
presidential spending trends discussed in this analysis, and argument can be made that it will. 
Despite the lack of parity in the distribution of Super PAC money nationwide, this study did 
suggest a positive relationship between the number of Super PACs active during the protection 
periods in Washington, DC and Philadelphia and the amount of Super PAC money spent. This 
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could combat the idea that Super PACs are growing in size and strength following Citizens 
United, instead suggesting that more individuals and organizations are establishing Super PACs.  
 Finally, a suggestion for future research on this topic would be a wider sample size. 
Initially, drawing data from five stations in three DMAs seemed sufficient to reflect a nationwide 
trend in Super PAC spending. However, the data collected show that the trend in Super PAC 
spending is not uniform across DMAs, and can therefore not be generalized using data from only 
three DMAs, especially three that lie in the same geographic region of the country. While it was 
previously noted that conducting the same research in a future time bracket would increase the 
likelihood of funding useable data from all stations in all three election years (as adoption of the 
FCC’s online upload system is now complete), even data collected from the same time period as 
this study would benefit from a sample including more of the most highly populated DMAs, 
regardless of their historical status as a “battleground state”.  
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions 
 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate a television industry claim about the future of 
political ad sales, while placing it in the larger context of the post-Citizens United political 
landscape and the period of growing economic uncertainty facing broadcast television stations. 
The claim purported that the Citizens United decision, which allowed for people or corporations 
to donate unlimited amounts to political campaigns and causes through third-party organizations 
known as Super PACs, would lead to an influx of political revenue for broadcast television 
stations. During competitive election seasons, Super PACs bolstered by unlimited donations 
would spend more liberally on advertising airtime to get convince voters to select their chosen 
candidate or stance on a political issue. The goal of this thesis was to determine if that theory had 
held true in the years following the Supreme Court decision in 2010, if political revenue had 
indeed risen in the four years between 2012 and 2016.  
 Two hypotheses were tested: First that increased Super PAC spending would cause a 
decrease in spending by campaigns between 2012 and 2016; and second, that increased Super 
PAC spending would increase TV stations’ political ad revenue from presidential and 
gubernatorial races between 2012 and 2016. The researcher employed quantitative analysis to 
allow inferences to be drawn objectively based on numerical trends. Three DMAs were chosen 
in historical “battleground states” - or states in which elections are often more competitive than 
in politically homogenous areas. In these three DMAs, both candidate and Super PAC spending 
data was gathered from the website of the Federal Communications Commission, on which every 
broadcast television station has been required to upload political contracts or invoices since 
2014. The chosen time period of 2012 through 2016 allowed data from both presidential and 
gubernatorial elections to be found in each of the DMAs. 
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 Upon analysis of the raw data, it was revealed that among the two complete data samples 
- data for all three years was available for only KYW in Philadelphia and WJLA in Washington, 
DC - that candidate spending was positively related to Super PAC spending between the 
presidential elections of 2012 and 2016. This disproved the first hypothesis. Further, while Super 
PAC spending and candidate spending did increase between the two presidential election years 
on KYW, both candidate and Super PAC spending fell in that time period on WJLA. Because the 
second hypothesis stated that overall political spending would increase when Super PAC 
spending increased, it was correct in terms of KYW’s numbers. However, the decrease in Super 
PAC and overall political revenue on WJLA disproved the assumption that Super PAC spending 
would increase on all stations. 
While this study did not yield any definitive correlation between candidate and Super 
PAC spending, the data gathered did suggest a positive relationship between the two in the 
DMAs studied. Additionally, for the two viable stations studied - KYW and WJLA - the number 
of Super PACs participating in an election was a factor, as more participants in an election 
yielded higher revenue, and fewer participants saw a revenue decrease in each of the six different 
elections studied. While this study on its own could not confirm these trends, it revealed a need 
for similar research on a nationwide scale because it determined that predictions of a general 
increase in Super PAC spending following the Citizens United decision did not reflect the more 
intricate effects of Super PACs’ expansion on political ad revenue on a regional basis, where 
some DMAs are seeing an influx of Super PAC money while others are seeing it decrease. 
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APPENDIX A: FULL DATA SET 
 
 
 
Table A.1 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2012, Barack Obama 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/30-11/6 2297 n/a n/a $253,000.00  n/a 
10/30-11/5 2298 n/a n/a $128,780.00  n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00  $0.00  $381,780.00  $0.00 
 
 
 
Table A.2 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2012, Mitt Romney 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/31-11/6   n/a n/a $189,880.00  n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00  $0.00  $189,880.00  $0.00 
 
 
 
Table A.3 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2012, Restore Our Future 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/30-11/6 1564 n/a n/a $160,250.00  n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00  $0.00  $160,250.00  $0.00 
 
 
 
Table A.4 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2012, Jewish Coalition Fund 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/30-11/6 1564 n/a n/a $160,250.00  n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00  $0.00  $160,250.00  $0.00 
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Table A.5 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012, Barack Obama 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/4-9/10 1686 n/a $68,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/4-9/17 1687 n/a $122,000.00  n/a n/a 
9/13-9/17 1768 n/a $84,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/15-9/21 1775 n/a $355,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/18-10/1 1781 n/a $175,900.00  n/a n/a 
9/18-9/24 1798 n/a $107,200.00  n/a n/a 
9/25-10/1 1844 n/a $142,000.00  n/a n/a 
9/28-10/4 1881 n/a $302,000.00  n/a n/a 
10/2-10/8 1905 n/a $131,225.00  n/a n/a 
10/9-10/15 2002 n/a $84,200.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $1,573,325.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.6 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012, Mitt Romney 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/7-9/10 363 n/a $145,450.00  n/a n/a 
9/12-9/18 375 n/a $164,070.00  n/a n/a 
9/19-9/25 379 n/a $389,025.00  n/a n/a 
9/26-10/2 387 n/a $373,500.00  n/a n/a 
10/6-10/9 add n/a $47,800.00  n/a n/a 
10/10-10/16 498 n/a $197,325.00 n/a n/a 
10/24-10/30 107 n/a $293,200.00  n/a n/a 
10/31-11/6 116 n/a $461,000.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $2,071,370.00  $0.00  $0.00  
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Table A.7 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012, American Crossroads 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/4-9/13 690 n/a $120,650.00  n/a n/a 
9/18-9/27 691 n/a $131,200.00  n/a n/a 
10/2-10/8 692 n/a $149,750.00  n/a n/a 
10/30-11/5 694 n/a $147,950.00 n/a n/a 
10/24-10/30 1257 n/a $275,100.00  n/a n/a 
10/31-11/5 1287 n/a $317,300.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $1,141,950.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.8 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012, Priorities USA Action 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/26-10/1 1562 n/a $28,200.00  n/a n/a 
10/2-10/8 1563 n/a $60,550.00  n/a n/a 
10/9-10/15 1564 n/a $62,550.00  n/a n/a 
10/16-10/22 1565 n/a $62,550.00  n/a n/a 
10/22-10/29 1566 n/a $64,950.00  n/a n/a 
10/23-10/29 1789 n/a $155,200.00  n/a n/a 
10/23-10/29 1566 n/a $64,950.00  n/a n/a 
10/30-11/6 1567 n/a $64,450.00  n/a n/a 
10/20-11/6 1790 n/a $200,600.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $764,000.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.9 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2012, Crossroads GPS 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/11-9/17 733 n/a $122,900.00  n/a n/a 
9/14-9/23 984 n/a $245,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/25-10/1 737 n/a $138,400.00  n/a n/a 
10/2-10/8 739 n/a $116,750.00  n/a n/a 
10/23-10/29 1246 n/a $266,100.00  n/a n/a 
10/30-11/5 1248 n/a $282,600.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $1,172,350.00  $0.00  $0.00  
      
Table A.10 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Ken Cuccinelli  
40 
 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/4-9/10 200 $38,360.00  $36,500.00  n/a n/a 
9/4-9/10 100 $36,180.00  $41,250.00  n/a n/a 
9/11-9/17 600 $107,020.00  $59,800.00  n/a n/a 
9/11-9/17 100 $91,100.00  $58,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/18-9/24 100 $58,570.00  $62,000.00  n/a n/a 
9/18-9/24 600 $27,690.00  $40,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/21-9/21 30 min TV ad   $5,000.00  n/a n/a 
9/25-10/3 600 $35,580.00  $57,600.00  n/a n/a 
9/25-10/3 100 $253,220.00  $101,750.00  n/a n/a 
10/2-10/8 100 $67,695.00  $49,150.00  n/a n/a 
10/9-10/15 100 $57,510.00  $54,300.00  n/a n/a 
10/10-10/15 100 ADD   $32,100.00  n/a n/a 
10/16/-10/16 100 ADD   $29,800.00  n/a n/a 
11/1-11/5 100 $14,520.00  $35,600.00  n/a n/a 
11/1-11/4 100   $25,200.00  n/a n/a 
11/2-11/5 10pckg add   $10,100.00  n/a n/a 
11/2-11/4 100 ADD   $21,100.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $787,445.00  $720,450.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.11 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Terry McAuliffe  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/4-9/9   $140,950.00  $133,225.00  n/a n/a 
9/10-9/16   $150,450.00  $121,900.00  n/a n/a 
9/17-9/23   $168,270.00  $160,200.00  n/a n/a 
9/24-9/30   $164,840.00  $165,700.00  n/a n/a 
10/1-10/7   $142,400.00  $183,175.00  n/a n/a 
10/8-10/14   $171,800.00  $124,300.00  n/a n/a 
10/15-10/21   $142,400.00  $62,500.00  n/a n/a 
10/22-10/28   $142,400.00  $93,500.00  n/a n/a 
10/29-11/4   $175,650.00  $102,400.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $1,399,160.00  $1,146,900.00  $0.00  $0.00  
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Table A.12 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Independence USA  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
10/23-11/5 Gov Race $519,350.00  $362,500.00  n/a n/a 
10/30-11/5     $295,250.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $519,350.00  $657,750.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.13 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Americans For Prosperity  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/8-9/8   $25,000.00  $12,000.00  n/a n/a 
9/22-9/22   $50,000.00    n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $75,000.00  $12,000.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.14 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Citizens United  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/18-9/23 3302 $52,900.00  $52,050.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $52,900.00  $52,050.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.15 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Ending Spending Action Fund  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/19-9/26 Gov Race $65,800.00  $40,900.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $65,800.00  $40,900.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.16 Washington, D.C., Gubernatorial Election 2013, Natural Resources Defense Fund  
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
9/24-9/30 2459 $60,900.00  $40,200.00  n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $60,900.00  $40,200.00  $0.00  $0.00  
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Table A.17 Cleveland-Akron, Gubernatorial Election 2014, John Kasich  
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
9/6-9/6     $3,000.00      
9/10-9/23 3932/3828 $55,000.00  $47,350.00  $32,425.00  $55,000.00  
9/24-10/3 3994 $52,000.00  $48,000.00  $12,085.00  $17,780.00  
10/7-10/13 3994/4097 $47,000.00    $25,275.00    
10/14-10/20 4146 $57,250.00  $43,900.00  $36,840.00  $64,000.00  
10/21-10/27 4197 $59,000.00  $45,000.00  $29,295.00    
10/21-11/4 4233 $40,475.00  $31,250.00  $16,025.00  $48,425.00  
10/28-11/4 4287 $55,425.00  $48,850.00  $33,775.00  $76,800.00  
11/3-11/3 4340 $12,675.00        
10/31-11/4 4340   $8,100.00  $5,425.00  $15,450.00  
TOTALS:   $378,825.00  $275,450.00  $191,145.00  $277,455.00  
      
 
 
Table A.18 Cleveland-Akron, Gubernatorial Election 2014, Ed Fitzgerald  
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
    n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TOTALS:   $0.00 $0.00  $0.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.19 Philadelphia, Gubernatorial Election 2014, Tom Corbett 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/8-9/14   $81,510.00  $97,400.00  $82,035.00  $47,750.00  
9/15-9/23   $53,600.00  $49,705.00  $58,905.00  $27,800.00  
9/24-9/30   $24,125.00  $50,750.00  $23,220.00  $12,800.00  
10/1-10/7   $41,750.00  $64,600.00  $43,765.00  $26,350.00  
10/8-10/14   $18,950.00  $46,000.00  $18,450.00  $17,800.00  
10/15-10/20   $89,400.00  $148,150.00  $77,445.00  $43,050.00  
10/21-10/27   $71,825.00  $115,750.00  $65,970.00  $63,875.00  
10/28-11/3   $55,375.00  $94,650.00  $53,145.00  $24,175.00  
TOTALS:   $436,535.00  $667,005.00  $422,935.00  $263,600.00  
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Table A.20 Philadelphia, Gubernatorial Election 2014, Tom Wolf 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/2-9/8 Wk 9 $48,250.00  $68,550.00  $60,245.00  $19,850.00  
9/9-9/15 wk 8 $61,050.00  $115,800.00  $46,890.00  $31,300.00  
9/16-9/22 wk 7 $61,925.00  $102,900.00  $35,365.00  $30,800.00  
9/23-9/29 wk 6 $69,025.00  $143,500.00  $36,690.00  $30,800.00  
9/30-10/6 wk 5 $66,850.00  $119,700.00  $47,470.00  $30,800.00  
10/7-10/13 wk 4 $93,425.00  $184,100.00  $69,605.00  $43,250.00  
10/14-10/20 wk 3 $104,125.00  $170,300.00  $71,965.00  $48,650.00  
10/21-10/27 wk 2 $99,825.00  $177,900.00  $73,365.00  $43,250.00  
10/28-11/4 wk 1 $129,625.00  $264,850.00  $85,015.00  $78,000.00  
TOTALS:   $734,100.00  $1,347,600.00  $526,610.00  $356,700.00  
 
 
 
Table A.21 Philadelphia, Gubernatorial Election 2014, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/8-9/14       $53,150.00    
TOTALS:   $0.00  $0.00  $53,150.00  $0.00  
 
 
 
Table A.22 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2016, Donald Trump 
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
9/12-9/16   $39,000.00  $19,395.00  $27,390.00  $41,450.00  
10/11-10/17 8025 $95,875.00  $54,025.00  $82,055.00  $110,000.00  
10/18-10/24 8026 $112,375.00  $50,425.00  $91,555.00  $98,900.00  
10/11-10/21 8183 $70,800.00  $47,500.00  $44,625.00  $64,450.00  
10/21-10/31 8241 $75,550.00  $36,150.00  $30,335.00  $89,800.00  
10/25-10/31 8027 $110,875.00  $33,975.00  $82,305.00  $130,100.00  
11/1-11/7 8261 $64,750.00  $38,900.00  $45,970.00  $82,950.00  
11/1-11/7 8028 $112,075.00  $45,425.00  $63,055.00  $191,400.00  
11/5-11/8 8598     $30,000.00  $34,000.00  
TOTALS:   $681,300.00  $325,795.00  $497,290.00  $843,050.00  
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Table A.23 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2016, Hillary Clinton 
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
9/12-9/16   $39,000.00  $19,395.00  $27,390.00  $41,450.00  
10/11-10/17 8025 $95,875.00  $54,025.00  $82,055.00  $110,000.00  
10/18-10/24 8026 $112,375.00  $50,425.00  $91,555.00  $98,900.00  
10/11-10/21 8183 $70,800.00  $47,500.00  $44,625.00  $64,450.00  
10/21-10/31 8241 $75,550.00  $36,150.00  $30,335.00  $89,800.00  
10/25-10/31 8027 $110,875.00  $33,975.00  $82,305.00  $130,100.00  
11/1-11/7 8261 $64,750.00  $38,900.00  $45,970.00  $82,950.00  
11/1-11/7 8028 $112,075.00  $45,425.00  $63,055.00  $191,400.00  
11/5-11/8 8598     $30,000.00  $34,000.00  
TOTALS:   $634,275.00  $500,025.00  $1,138,695.00  $1,195,450.00  
 
 
 
Table A.24 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2016, Make America #1 
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
10/9-10/9 DEBATE   $21,000.00  $10,000.00  $15,000.00  
TOTALS:   $0.00  $21,000.00  $10,000.00  $15,000.00  
 
 
 
Table A.25 Cleveland-Akron, Presidential Election 2016, Priorities USA Action 
  
Estimate 
# WKYC WEWS WOIO WJW 
9/13-9/18 4555 $37,100.00  $48,900.00  $52,025.00    
9/20-9/26 4557 $39,600.00  $49,400.00  $50,675.00    
9/27-10/3 4558 $63,950.00  $76,500.00  $113,925.00    
10/4-10/10 4559 $83,350.00  $81,500.00  $89,425.00    
10/11-10/17 4560 $64,450.00  $90,500.00  $114,925.00    
10/18-10/24 4561 $97,450.00  $71,500.00  $72,925.00  $115,550.00  
10/25-10/31 4562 $55,350.00  $124,250.00  $87,775.00  $154,450.00  
11/1-11/8 4563 $51,900.00  $130,050.00  $62,675.00  $99,150.00  
TOTALS:   $493,150.00  $672,600.00  $644,350.00  $369,150.00  
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Table A.26 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Donald Trump 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/12-9/16   $42,050.00  $54,180.00  $35,000.00  $35,750.00  
10/11-10/21 8184 $70,600.00  $73,980.00  $64,500.00  $86,100.00  
10/11-10/17 8029 $97,430.00  $131,755.00  $137,125.00  $122,300.00  
10/18-10/24 8030 $115,300.00  $173,070.00  $158,825.00  $111,900.00  
10/22-10/31 8242 $119,425.00  $78,490.00  $74,175.00  $56,400.00  
10/25-10/31 8031 $134,675.00  $155,000.00  $148,875.00  $114,100.00  
11/1-11/7 8032 $113,500.00  $168,695.00  $142,425.00  $135,100.00  
11/1-11/7 8262 $74,125.00  $89,445.00  $91,075.00  $102,150.00  
11/6-11/6 8598     $120,000.00    
TOTALS:   $767,105.00  $924,615.00  $972,000.00  $763,800.00  
 
 
 
Table A.27 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Hillary Clinton 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/13-9/19 5285 $99,100.00  $129,835.00  $64,975.00  $77,550.00  
9/20-9/26 5286 112950 120420 $133,450.00  $103,850.00  
9/27-10/3 5287 $117,200.00  $140,555.00  $95,075.00  $108,750.00  
10/4-10/9 6060       $36,000.00  
10/4-10/10 5288 76000 123555 $81,650.00  $111,750.00  
10/6-10/11 5559 38000 49730 $44,250.00  $37,000.00  
10/11-10/16 5560 82000 107420 $67,000.00  $106,000.00  
10/11-10/17 5289 $116,925.00  $43,295.00  $59,275.00  $46,050.00  
10/18-10/24 5290 $136,625.00  $188,475.00  $105,750.00  $136,800.00  
10/25-10/31 5291 138100 188310 $123,430.00  $80,300.00  
10/25-10/31 5770 $220,850.00  $180,500.00  $131,050.00  $202,100.00  
10/31-11/7 5879 $127,675.00  $142,500.00  $153,080.00  $138,450.00  
11/1-11/7 5292 $110,600.00  $227,130.00  $126,710.00  $116,400.00  
11/1-11/6 5835 188400 198470 $139,850.00  $229,100.00  
TOTALS:   $1,564,425.00  $1,840,195.00  $1,325,545.00  
$1,530,100.
00  
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Table A.28 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Priorities USA Action 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
9/20-9/26 4557 $95,400.00  $198,450.00  $136,975.00  $11,000.00  
9/27-10/3 4558 $91,200.00  $181,850.00  $120,100.00  $58,300.00  
10/4-10/10 4559   $177,150.00  $103,100.00  $67,200.00  
10/11-10/17 4560   $196,250.00  $109,550.00  $54,800.00  
10/18-10/24 4561   $195,950.00  $109,325.00  $59,950.00  
10/25-10/31 4562   $137,550.00  $154,175.00  $56,300.00  
10/31-11/8 4563   $167,150.00  $162,700.00  $50,400.00  
11/1-11/7 5391   $427,850.00  $400,350.00  $159,000.00  
11/5-11/5 5412 $22,800.00  $66,100.00  $4,000.00  $55,400.00  
TOTALS:   $209,400.00  $1,748,300.00  $1,300,275.00  $572,350.00  
 
 
 
Table A.29 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, 45 Committee 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/4-10/10 c04c10   $59,800.00  $321,450.00  $78,450.00  
10/26-11/1 c26n01 $10,100.00  $57,800.00  $97,000.00  $34,500.00  
11/2-11/8 n02npa   $100,000.00  $662,650.00    
TOTALS:   $10,100.00  $217,600.00  $1,081,100.00  $112,950.00  
 
 
 
Table A.30 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Great America PAC 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
11/3-11/8 2644 $141,200.00  $496,000.00  $884,650.00  $312,200.00  
TOTALS:   $141,200.00  $496,000.00  $884,650.00  $312,200.00  
 
 
 
Table A.31 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Make America #1 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/9-10/9 DEBATE   $17,000.00  $19,950.00  $10,000.00  
TOTALS:   $0.00  $17,000.00  $19,950.00  $10,000.00  
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Table A.32 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, National Horizon 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/24-11/7 324 $143,900.00  $404,200.00  $163,200.00  $69,900.00  
TOTALS:   $143,900.00  $404,200.00  $163,200.00  $69,900.00  
 
 
 
Table A.33 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Rebuilding America Now 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
10/31-11/3 754   $309,100.00  $225,400.00  $131,000.00  
TOTALS:   $0.00  $309,100.00  $225,400.00  $131,000.00  
 
 
 
Table A.34 Philadelphia, Presidential Election 2016, Women Vote 
  
Estimate 
# WCAU WPVI KYW WTXF 
11/4-11/8   $271,000.00      $170,450.00  
11/2-11/8     $440,000.00  $360,000.00  $125,000.00  
11/5-11/8         $10,000.00  
TOTALS:   $271,000.00  $440,000.00  $360,000.00  $305,450.00  
 
 
 
Table A.35 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2016, Donald Trump 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
10/18-10/24     $82,700.00      
10/18-10/24 8033 $147,200.00  $34,350.00  $148,750.00  $113,750.00  
10/25-11/2 8034 $37,450.00    $31,000.00  $12,025.00  
11/1-11/7 8035 $175,550.00  $109,600.00  $130,750.00  $86,000.00  
TOTALS:   $360,200.00  $226,650.00  $310,500.00  $211,775.00  
 
 
 
Table A.36 Washington, D.C., Presidential Election 2016, Hillary Clinton 
  
Estimate 
# WRC WJLA WUSA WTTG 
10/31-11/8 5292 $168,200.00  $119,700.00  $78,250.00  $198,175.00  
TOTALS:   $168,200.00  $119,700.00  $78,250.00  $198,175.00  
 
